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Some Reflections on Business-Government
Relationst
Professor Kaysen examines an idealization of the busi-
ness community's view of proper business-government
relationships, and analyzes the extent to which practical
considerations frequently lead businessmen to prefer
relationships contrary to the precepts of the idealization.
He notes a trend toward pragmatic solutions to problems
on ad hoc bases, replacing the former preference for the
predictability of a priori commitments.
Carl Kaysen*
I. INTRODUCTION
Arguments concerning the character and principles of busi-
ness-government relations have been a staple of American politi-
cal discussion since Colonial days. When such specific issues as
chartering the Bank of the United States, federal regulation of
railroads, or creation of the Federal Reserve System were de-
bated, the intensity of argument rose, and the level of concern in
the business community was high. When President Calvin
'Coolidge could say that the business of America is business, we
were passing through what was perhaps the last period in which
'the issue seemed settled, even to one of the major parties in the
discussion.
Since the Depression, the problem of business-government
relations has been near the forefront of business thought, though
the intensity of concern with it has fluctuated with the level and
character of government activity. Regulatory legislation, gov-
-ernment spending, government deficits, and changes in taxes
retain their capacity for arousing interest, but the additional
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novel elements of wage-price guidelines and government tar-
gets for private business transactions in foreign markets repre-
sent both objects and modes of government activity in the eco-
nomic sphere that have aroused intense new concerns in the busi-
ness community.
II. THE BUSINESS VIEW IDEALIZED
There is wide agreement in our individualistic society on the
effectiveness of market institutions as the chief means of organiz-
ing and controlling economic activities. Accordingly, there is a
presumption in the economic sphere against use of non-market
means in general, and against government activity in particular.
A synthetic view of business discussion of government interven-
tion in economic life suggests that three kinds of limiting cri-
teria are considered desirable: limitations on appropriate sphere
or objectives; limitations on appropriate means or policy instru-
ments; and limitations on total extent.
A. LImiTATIONS ON SCOPE OF GOVERNM ENTAL AcTION
This view would admit some enlargement of Adam Smith's
three categories of appropriate functions for the state: defense,
administration of justice, and maintenance of such public works
and institutions "which it can never, be for the interest of any
individual, or small number of individuals, .to erect and main-
tain; because the profit could never repay the expense to any
individual or small number of individuals, though it may fre-
quently do much more than repay it to a great society." Or as
expressed in the terminology of modern welfare economics,
this means those activities for which external effects are signif-
icant. Smith further divided this category into those public
works required for facilitating commerce ,and those involving
education.
1. Shiftin Erniihasis .
Perhaps the first modern enlargement would be one of em-
phasis, interpreting the administration of justice to give a greater
role to law making, law interpreting, and law enforcing institu-
tions in providing the framework of legal rules within which
private transactions in an enterprise economy can take place.
It would be recognized that there is no "natural" set of rules
that hold good for all time. New situations may demand new
definitions of what is a "property right" and what is not. The
Securities Exchange Act can be pointed to as marking one such
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change, and the current discussion of fair housing legislation as
marking another.
2. Additional Public Works
The second enlargement would recognize several further
categories of public works and institutions. Legitimacy of gov-
ernment spending on problems relating to public health is hardly
questioned. Neither is spending to advance basic scientific
knowledge. Whether it is the responsibility of government to
provide for conservation of irreplaceable natural resources, such
as forests or wild seashores, may be less widely agreed. Within
this category there would also be a shift in emphasis from
Smith's original insistence on the desirability of financing educa-
tion largely from fees to a greater willingness to believe that
quality education can be supported by tax revenue or private
foundations.
3. New Categories
In addition, at least three wholly new categories would be
added to Smith's original three. The first is the provision for
relief or welfare for those unable to earn or otherwise obtain a
minimum standard of living. The second involves prevention of
artificial or contrived monopoly and regulation of technically
inevitable or natural monopoly. It is now generally recognized
that simple laissez faire does not guarantee maintenance of
competition, the central regulator of a market economy. Some
policy to prevent restriction of competition by those who would
otherwise be forced to compete is recognized as a necessary
task of government, though there are wide differences in the
definition of kind and degree of government activity called for.
It is also widely, if not unanimously, recognized that, in those
industries in which the efficient scale of operation in relation to
market size makes monopoly or near monopoly inevitable, regu-
lation which prevents the monopolist from charging what the
traffic will bear and from discriminating among his customers is
necessary and desirable. Again, the specific form of regulation
is frequently an object of debate, the principle is not.
In Adam Smith's day, the state appeared to be the source of
all monopoly, and thus it is not surprising that he neglected
this category of regulatory activities. Today the importance of
the state as a source of monopoly power is perhaps less talked
about by businessmen than by economists. One reason for this
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may be that there are significant areas where businessmen are
the beneficiaries of state creation of monopoly power. The ship-
ping industry could be mentioned as a striking example of gov-
ernment created monopoly which benefits a segment of business
for which the rest of us suffer.
The third additional category of activity now generally rec-
ognized as appropriate for government is provision for a mone-
tary mechanism and regulation of the supply of money. Here
again questions of how much, what, and by what instruments are
subject to debate. The principle is not. It is worth noting that
in 1912, when the late Senator Carter Glass proposed legislation
to create the Federal Reserve System, leading bankers and busi-
nessmen testified that to do so would be to end the free enter-
prise system. But here again is an example of new understand-
ing leading to new views of what is appropriate policy. The
Federal Reserve System has come to be regarded as something
of a bulwark of free enterprise rather than its enemy.
A fourth category of legitimate government functions in
economic life is regulation of aggregate demand at a level not so
low as to permit unnecessary unemployment, and not so high as
to promote inflation. This would clearly be recognized as an
appropriate responsibility of government by the consistent, un-
prejudiced, politically neutral, neo-classical economist intent on
obtaining the most efficient perfornmance possible from the mar-
ket economy. It is not yet certain, however, that the consensus
in the business community recognizes this as equally appropriate
with the preceding- three additions to the original list. Skep-
ticism in this regard may be unwarranted. But in spite of wide-
spread enthusiasm for the results of the 1964 tax reduction, the
understanding of the requirements and possibilities of an active
fiscal policy, which is the necessary prerequisite of honest ac-
ceptance, seems to be lacking. Current discussion of the de-
sirability of a tax increase and the wisdom or necessity of cutting
federal expenditures lends substance to these doubts.
B. LIMITATIONS ON MODE OF OPERATION
Here, our ideal business view would be cast in terms of the
polarity between "rules" and "authority," between a government
of laws and a government of men. Government is viewed essen-
tially as a rule maker and umpire for the actors on the economic
scene, rather than as one of the actors, save perhaps in ,the
sphere of defense. Government of law, embodied in well-defined
rules, predictable in their scope and impact, is the desirable ideal.
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Conversely, existence of wide areas of discretion for decisions of
governmental authority, bounded only by agreed upon goals
which the authority can seek through any action appropriate to
particular circumstances, is undesirable. In terms of the politi-
cal machinery of the American government, this tends to trans-
late into a preference for legislation and the Congress over dis-
cretion and the Executive. If legislation cannot be self-defining
and self-enforcing, the "independent" commission is preferred
over a department of the executive branch. Since the executive
branch of government is organized for effective action, this ex-
plains the preference against it. Further, discretionary authority
is susceptible to favoritism and corruption on the one hand,
and unfair pressure and politically selective application on the
other. By contrast, the impersonality of rules helps to insure
equity and honesty in their application. A further element in
selecting the suitable mode of government action is localism-a
preference for state over federal and local over state action.
Limitations on mode and limitations on scope need not fit
neatly together. Not every objective of government policy in-
cluded on the list offered above can be attained most efficiently,
or even at all, by use of what are considered appropriate policy
instruments. An effective defense procurement policy, for ex-
ample, might require a large degree of discretionary executive
authority both in choosing sources of supply and in negotiating
contracts; this is quite at variance with the notion of impersonal,
universally and uniformly applicable rules. Making monetary
policy provides another example of the need for a wide degree of
discretion as well as a question as to just where in the apparatus
of government this discretion should be lodged, especially in re-
lation to discretion in other areas of economic policy. In both
cases, some accommodation is made to pragmatic necessities, al-
though there is usually little recognition of them in broader
philosophic discussions of what is "right."
C. LnhVITATIONS ON TOTAL ExTET
In general, the abstract business view prescribes limits on
government activity. Accordingly, it emphasizes restrictions on
appropriate modes at the expense of efficient performance of
appropriate functions. This general orientation is expressed in
the third kind of limitation, resting on a quite different rationale:
a limit on the absolute size of government activity. This em-
phasis in turn leads business spokesmen to emphasize ineffi-
ciency and corruption in all government operation. The proposi-
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tion that more government is worse government is frequently
expressed in terms that go a great deal more than halfway in
the range from Lockean distrust of the element of coercion that
appears to be inescapably bound up with government activity to
the Birchian belief that each dollar of government expenditure
is further progress down the road to socialism.
It is tempting to enter into a discussion of the correctness of
the set of judgments embodied in this somewhat sketchy syn-
thesis of what might be called the business consensus on busi-
ness-government relations. But instead let us look briefly into
the sources of the views on correct relations of business and gov-
ernment and consider the extent to which the business com-
munity chooses to support policies conducive to the idealized
business-government relationship.
III. ORIGINS OF THE BUSINESS VIEW
A. HISTORICAL
One important element in explanation of the business view
on these matters is that, historically, it has been substantially
the American view. It is not merely a coincidence that Wealth
of Nations was published in 1776. The American Revolution
was, in great part, a revolt against the impact of mercantilist
policies of the mother country on the colonies. Though the Con-
stitution did not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, Lockean
traditions of the value of private property and the dangers of
government power were built deeply into the foundations of
American ideas of the good society. These same traditional
sources bear with equal weight on the choice of preferred modes
of government action: executive discretion in the hands of the
monarch spelled tyranny; a government of laws, freedom.
A century later, when much of the basic legislative founda-
tion for the relation between business and the federal govern-
ment was enacted, the climate of popular attitudes toward busi-
ness did much to reinforce the effects of these earlier experi-
ences, although operating in quite a different fashion. Popular
hostility toward big business expressed itself in a variety of
ways, including, most importantly for present purposes, the em-
bodiment in the Interstate Commerce Commission and Sherman
Acts of a particular conception of proper relations between busi-
ness and government. Government was to enforce rules of
socially desirable conduct on a business community which, in-
stead of regulating itself naturally, was banding together to ex-
ploit the public. Hence, agencies which carried out the regula-
[Vol. 51: 63
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tory task and business enterprises subject to their scrutiny stood
at arms length, viewing each other with suspicion and even hos-
tility. Basically, this attitude still remains, and is considered the
appropriate stance for regulator and regulated. To be sure, in
the case of the ICC a long and familiar association has dulled
somewhat the keen edge of this relation; a similar process of
growing intimacy between every regulatory agency with a fixed
clientele and its clients has occurred with similar results. None-
theless, in a broad sense the hostile attitudes toward business-
especially big business-which expressed themselves in the origi-
nal legislation made a permanent imprint. Nor have populist
sentiments vanished with the social and economic settings which
engendered them. There is still a broad popular suspicion of big
business, and the admiration with which the general public views
its achievements is mixed with some fear of its powers.
B. BusINEss-GovERNiENT HosTLrry
The ideological preference for impersonality of formal rules
over intimacy of discretionary authority in business-government
relations is reinforced by an attitude of hostility between the two
parties involved. This attitude is. sometimes given fairly open
expression in administration of anti-trust law. Businessmen of-
ten view prosecutions under these laws as simply attempts at
punishment of success, or of inevitable business conduct. On the
other side, many officials of the anti-trust agencies are sustained
in their efforts by a crusading spirit of anti-big business zeal.
This reflects a widely popular sentiment which goes far to ex-
plain the continued vitality of antitrust laws three-quarters of a
century after their original enactment. Indeed, it is striking that,
in spite of a constantly high level of business grumbling about
their capricious enforcement and their anti-economic effects,
these major pieces of economic regulatory legislation have suf-
fered little significant legislative amendment. In fact, they have
grown harsher in their standards and broader in their reach
through the process of administrative application and judicial
interpretation. This may reflect the depth in the public mind of
the sentiments and attitudes they embody, rather than a wide-
spread, passionate attachment to the significance of the equilib-
rium of perfect competition.
C. COMPETrTION FOR LEADERSHIP OF SocIETY
Beyond these explanations in terms of history and tradition,
the struggle for power and prestige in a politically competitive
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and pluralistic society is an important current element in the
antagonistic relations between business and government. In our
highly industrialized and democratic society, big business is ob-
viously a minority group, and it naturally views a government
responsive to popular demands for welfare, economic security,
and income redistribution as at least potentially hostile. Nor
has the record shown these suspicions to be groundless, whatever
one may think of the wisdom of business views on any particu-
lar piece of legislation or social policy. Further, there is a gen-
eral struggle over the symbols of leadership and legitimate power.
Business leaders and politicians are competitors in the race for
social leadership, and one side's gain is considered the other's
loss. Certainly competition in this respect was one of the more
important facets of the dramatic clash over the price of steel
between the President of the United States and the President of
United States Steel Corporation. This point may also be related
to the importance of localism in business views about govern-
ment, since smaller governmental units are obviously easier
opponents in every way. The same steel corporation looms in-
comparably larger in Pittsburg or Wheeling than in Washington,
D.C.
D.. THE EU ROPEAN EXPERIENCE
Although the same basic potehtial for political Conflict ex-
ists in Europe, even the most superficial comparison betweefi
the United States and the industrial market economies of West-
erni Europe emphasizes the special character of American views
on proper relations of business and government. In none of
those countries does the view prevail that somewhat hostile,
arms-length, formally prescribed relations should be the norm.
This is seen in acceptance of informal. contacts, and in inore" or
less direct, though not legally prescribed or *circumscribed, 0iego-
tiations between the executive authorities of government, busi-
ness executives, and business associations. To be sure, the dif-
ference between parliamentary and congressional government
accounts for some of this difference since the exectutive branch
of the United States is simply less free to engage in such negotia-
tions. But the critical difference lies deeper. 'The kind of rela-
tionship between government planners and business groups on
which the French planning process depends is hard to compre-
hend in the United States outside of a war economy. Even then
it would depend to a great extent on specific statutory authority.
Or to take a quite different kind of example, a Monopolies Com-
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mission proceeding in the United Kingdom can recommend that
a Minister and the companies investigated privately and inform-
ally discuss ways of improving practices that were subject to
complaint. Or, in the Netherlands and Sweden, wage negotia-
tions between Trade Union Federations and Employers' Associa-
tions, with or without formal participation of government repre-
sentatives, have a quasi-governmental status, and an effect as
strong as if they were legally prescribed.
The place of business and businessmen in European history
has been different and lower than in America. High prestige of
government and "natural popular acceptance of broad governmen-
tal authority result from continuity with the monarchical and
aristocratic past. Whether these differences in historical experi-
ences and tradition are sufficient to account for the striking dif-
ference in American and European views of proper business and
government relations is not clear.
E. AN IDEOLOGICAL ELEMENT
To these causes should be added the existence of a purely
ideological element in the hostility of American business toward
government. In legitimizing its own place in the social world,
business has found it ideologically and emotionally useful to cast
government in a negative role, i.e., to project onto it responsibil-
ity for what goes wrong in the economy in particular and in
society in general, and to find in the politician an anti-hero,
whose vices underline .the virtues of the businessman. Business-
men, orat least successful businessmen, are energetic, practical,
inventive, responsible, and subject to the discipline of the bal-
ance sheet and the test of the market place. Government, by
contrast, is run by a'mixture of politicians and bureaucrats. The
politicians are seen more or less explicitly as corrupt, and- en-
gaged either in pandering to voter prejudice or deceiving the
electorate: Bureaucrats appear in the alternate images of routine
time servers, or impractical, academic theorists-professors in
disguise-who' have never' met a payroll. Money received in
taxes is "taken" from the consumer or businessman; however,
money received by him in a particular market transaction is
"given" to and "earned" by the recipient. Since government
c'an spend where it has not earned, it can never achieve that
responsible conduct of its affairs which is enforced by the dis-
cipline of the market place. This of course is caricature, but
caricature is 'the essence of ideology,' and is what public pro-




The ideological element in business hostility to government
is important precisely because it does not yield to explanation
on pragmatic grounds. While the struggle for power and prestige
may be viewed as rational, complete rejection of the strategy em-
bodied in the old axiom "if you can't lick them, join them" is not.
This ideological element is precisely what is absent in European
business attitudes, and its absence is consistent with the much
greater tendency of European businessmen to follow the axiom
in their relations with government.
IV. DIVERGENCE IN PRACTICE
Such are the precepts, but are they indeed followed in prac-
tice? On the whole, they are not. While it is not feasible to
demonstrate this by a comprehensive and concrete examination
of the whole range of business-government relations, the salient
examples presented below will give this assertion sufficient
weight to make the proposition interesting, if not indubitably
convincing.
A. ANTRUST LAWS
Antitrust laws often serve as useful symbols of just the kind
of ring-holding function that government should perform. In
general, business commentators on antitrust policy tend to argue
for "rule of reason" doctrines, and against per se rules of liability.
Yet it is per se rules that provide the closest approximation to
the automatic, uniformly enforced, impersonal rule. The rule of
reason allows for a wide range of interpretation in which prose-
cutors can select different cases as exemplifying illegal conduct,
and different courts can come to different conclusions, with the
consequence that predictability of the law's application declines.
Recent cases on conglomerate and vertical mergers, and large
differences in the way various trial courts have treated problems
of market definition or exclusionary effects of vertical mergers,
amply illustrate this point. Recent amendment of the Bank
Merger Act-which had the support of the business community-
exemplifies this point in concrete terms. The new Act provides
agencies with regulatory responsibility for banking-the Con-
troller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System,-wide latitude in approving bank mergers. The
agencies may evaluate "banking factors" in relation to "com-
petitive effects." Even if a merger has a prospective negative
effect on competition, they may approve it if advantages in terms
of banking factors outweigh competitive disadvantages. The
[Vol. 51:63
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situation before enactment of this legislation had-through judi-
cial interpretation of section 7 of the Clayton Act and the earlier
version of the Bank Merger Act-settled down to a per se rule
whereby it could be confidently predicted that any bank merger
involving banks which in aggregate controlled more than
twenty-five per cent of the local market would be outlawed.
From the point of view of banks which wish to grow by merger,
the reasons for preferring the new to the old situation are clear;
from the point of view of an ideal theory of business-govern-
ment relations, the reason for the opposite position is equally
clear.
B. AT&T mm Tm FCC
Recent relations between American Telephone and Telegraph
Company and the Federal Communications Commission provide
another example of a preference for authority over rules. The
Commission has power to regulate interstate rates of the com-
pany. For some time now, this has been done by informal discus-
sion between the company and the Commission. Recently, the
Commission initiated a formal rate-making proceeding, with
hearings, a written record, and an opinion of the Commission.
The company reacted strongly and negatively; private negotiation
had worked satisfactorily in the past, why not continue it?
Again, the company's reasons for its position are not too hard to
find. The formal proceedings would produce a record which
some of the more aggressive state regulatory agencies-for in-
stance those of California and New York-might find useful in
their own proceedings, especially in the difficult matter of sep-
arating property of the company and its subsidiaries used in
interstate business from that used intrastate. Further, the very
formality of the proceedings might induce the Commission to
deal more sternly with the company than'it had in its informal
proceedings. The company had a good basis for rising above
principle; nonetheless, the fact that they did so is worth noting.
C. WAGE-PRICE GUIDELINES
Consideration of wage-price guidelines, which are the center
of much of the current controversy on our topic subject, is more
complex and perhaps less dramatic. In general, individual busi-
ness firms have accepted, sometimes rather reluctantly, what
might be called government reminders on price guidelines. The
business community as a whole, however, has reacted strongly
and negatively, believing that they represent a classic case of the
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"wrong" kind of government action, the kind that is described as
"interference" with functioning of the market. This view has
also• been shared by trade unions, but that is the subject of an-
other paper. Today it is doubtful that the guidelines alone could
be depended on to achieve price stability due to the already low
levels of unemployment and continuing high aggregate demancL
Some further restraints on aggregate demand also appear desir-
able., But this has not been forthcoming since the wage-price
guidelines were first articulated in the 1962 Economic Report.
Criticism7 of them was no less intense then than now, but no
alternatives were advanced for moving toward high employ-
ment and maintaining price stability which were more in keeping
with standards of appropriate government policy. It can be spec-
ulated, however, that if the business community had been offered
a choice between the guidelines and a sufficiently vigorous anti-
trust policy in the relevant markets-including both movements
against collusive pricing and structural reorganization in highly
concentrated industries-to reinforce competitive constraints on
wage-price interaction, it would have chosen the guidelines. This1
of course, is only speculation, and the difficulty of specifying
how ."hard" an anti-trust policy of structural reorganization
would have been needed to achieve the desired results makes the
ihyp othetical choice involved less than precise. But we can say
that the !'minimum" would require a much more vigorous effort
at dissolution in a number of highly concentrated markets pro-
ducing basic materials, capital equipment, and consumers' dur
ables- than has ever been -contemplated by those. who enforce
antitrust laws. Further, the argument is complicated by the pos,
sible conflict in values between the business community and suc-
cessive governments on the relative importance of low unem-
ployment and price stability. Since it, is difficult to explicitly
express opposition to lowering unemployment, attack on -the
guidelines offered-a less direct approach, though fortunately not
a particularly effective one.
Today the hard edge of the problem lies in the question of a
tax increase. Business should "in principle" prefer a tax in-
crease to a continuation of informal controls and presidential
exhortations. Better suspension of the seven per cent investment
credit than- acceptance of unspecific White House urgings to
trim investment programs.
D. THE BALANCE oF PAYMNrs PROBLEM
- Business reception of government policies directed- toward
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eliminating or reducing the balance of payments deficit -pro-
vides a final and even sharper example of the divergence be
tween precept and practice. Here again government has re-
sorted to a set of measures that contradict the canons of proper
policy. From the interest equalization tax to the targets for
foreign transactions of individual firms, arrived at by private
informal discussion between high officials of the government and
executives of the firms involved, enforced by public and private
exhortation, and without the warrant of legislative authority,
the whole process displays every characteristic of policy making
that the business view condemns. The clear alternative is to
rely on the price system, either by devaluing the dollar or allow-
ing it to float against Continental currencies. Devaluation would
require agreement from reluctant surplus countries, but a float-
ing exchange is available as a unilateral choice. There are
strong arguments to be made against both of these policy choices,
but the arguments are not so overwhelming as to rule these al-
ternatives out of consideration. Many academic critics, covering
the whole spectrum from "liberalism" to "conservatism," have
supported some such policy. Yet no business critic of foreign
investment guideposts and other informal controls on interna-
tional capital movements has put the alternative forward. In
fact, banking and business leaders, both by what they have said
and what they have not said, have made it plain that they prefer
the informal controls. Indeed, the strong attachment of the bank-
ing community to the present international monetary system has
been one of the moving forces that has led the government to
the kinds of policies it has chosen.
V. FUNCTION OF THE IDEAL STANDARD
These examples suggest that the business community gets
the style of government policies it wants, even if this is not at
all the style it commends in abstract -discussion- of appropriate
relations between government and business. Of course, in. every
case particular pragmatic reasons can be discerned which ac-
count for espousal or acceptance of a policy line so much at vari-
ance with professed ideal standards. But then .what is the func-
tion of the ideal standard?
Treating this question as literal and not rhetorical, two -dis-
similar answers are suggested. Discussions of the proper role for
government or the proper mode of government activity can be
seen as simply an instrument in the political power struggle, a
way of advancing group interests of business against other- group
19661
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interests. The particular arguments used can be interpreted as
a method of securing a more favorable bargaining situation for
business interests by attacking a variety of kinds and modes of
government activities which historically have been used more on
behalf of other interest groups than on behalf of business.
Government activity in the economic sphere has been in the di-
rection of changing the status quo, whether in distribution of
income or distribution of power. Business has resisted the
change, and business arguments on the proper role of govern-
ment have formed part of the instruments of resistance.
The difficulty of this explanation is its failure to account for
rejection of the alternative strateg--espousal of close informal
cooperation between business and government so that the ends
and instruments of government policy are shaped more closely
to business desires. The Continental examples illustrate the
feasibility of this alternative, and in the United States, where
no respectable or popular socialist party or movement exists,
obstacles to it would be even less than in Europe. Further, the
search for consensus, to which a democratic administration is
inevitably committed, makes this a policy particularly suited to
the political position of business groups. Objectively viewed,
this line is more likely to be successful than the line which has
in fact been pursued.
Alternatively, we can recognize that business pronounce-
ments on the role of government are a key part of a more general
business ideology. If this view is to be accepted it must also be
recognized that the primary functions of ideology are not ra-
tional and instrumental. Rather, they are responsive to de-
mands for affirmation of group worth and group solidarity, and
for justification-in sociologically rather than logically relevant
terms-of group status in a larger world. The function of busi-
ness ideology is to legitimize the position and powers, functions
and rewards, of businessmen and business institutions in our
society, both as against other groups and internally to the busi-
nessman himself. It is never enough in any society to be rich and
powerful. It is always necessary to be justly so. "Divine right
of kings" could be viewed as less an argument for absolute power
and more as legitimation of whatever power a monarch in fact
enjoyed. From this perspective a particularly high correlation
between what is said ideologically and what is actually done in
a particular context cannot be expected, even though the ideology
is cast in the form of prescriptions for right action. Thus the
divergence requires no particular explanation. But though ide-
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ologies are not detailed blueprints for social action, they can and
do influence it by the values they emphasize and the attitudes
they embody. Business ideology has helped to nourish and rein-
force a degree of hostility between government and business, and
to deny legitimacy to some kinds of government policy, in ways
that were certainly neither inevitable nor necessarily corre-
sponding with a "rational" view of business interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
A proponent of reasoned discussion of public policy, in-
cluding a reasoned evaluation of the gains and costs of alterna-
tive possible uses of state power, must deplore the large ideologi-
cal element in business views on these matters. In this spirit, it
is tempting to argue that business should either get what it
says it wants-which it would frequently be most unwilling to
accept-or change its tune, and confess to wanting what it gets.
The second alternative would allow more open and focused dis-
cussion of genuine issues in terms of the balance among com-
peting values and competing power claims, as subjects for nego-
tiation in terms of more or less, rather than ideological dispute
in terms of all or nothing. This in turn might achieve more
effective social action where it is indicated, as well as greater
social harmony in matters of economic policy, which can be
viewed as a valuable goal in itself. President Kennedy, in a
speech (at the Yale commencement in 1962) that was received
with little enthusiasm at the time and has been widely disre-
garded since, put forward the need for a more rational, more
tolerant, more pragmatic, more managerially oriented discussion
of the problems of public policy.
But there is a contrary view. Hostility and conflict have
their values, especially in a complicated, diverse, and pluralis-
tic society. Ideology and counter-ideology generate the steam of
emotional commitment which is important to the politics of de-
mocracy, and too much social harmony may be the inhibitor of
social and political innovation. Merely rational discussion of
technical problems may be insufficiently energetic to raise as
wide a set of alternatives and to stimulate as searching an ex-
amination of them as do the more passionate debates produced
when ideological commitments are involved. Nor do debates
among technicians arouse the interest and involvement of the
wider sections of society that should be concerned in these vital
decisions. From this perspective, the views of the business com-
munity on the proper relations of government and business
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should not be evaluated merely in terms of accuracy of their
descriptions of the current state of those relations, or of sophisti-
cation of their underlying economic models, or of consistency and
cogency of the political philosophy they embody, but should be
accepted as the expression of a significant and persistent body of
sentiment which must be respected in shaping policy
This is my own view Perhaps I have come to it more easily
because I think the business views that I have here described
have for some time been minority views in our society, and I
appreciate the role of forceful expression of minority views in
shaping social policy. Were these ideological views on proper
spheres and modes of government action to replace ad hoc prag-
matism, which I believe is now the majority view, though largely
unarticulated, perhaps I would be stimulated to move from the
stance of sociological comment to that of ideological combat.
